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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on administrative reforms launched within the UN system. It is based on an empirical 
analysis of the UNAIDS Programme, an interorganizational system bringing together ten UN agencies to 
combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic, with the support of a Secretariat. Firstly, the paper pays attention to UN 
system-wide reform as an institutional context that created a momentum for reforming UNAIDS. Secondly, it 
explores the conditions under which the reform of UNAIDS has been implemented since the early 2000s. 
Thirdly, it examines some of the side effects of the reform, with particular emphasis on competition between UN 
agencies, organizational complexity, and bureaucratization. The conclusion argues that multilateral agencies 
have turned their primary attention to management challenges in the 2000s, but reformers have not proved to be 
able to anticipate and control the various effects of the change they have initiated.  
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This paper concentrates on public administration reforms within the multilateral 
system to improve the global response to HIV and AIDS, in the context of the system-wide 
reform experienced by UN organizations during the last decade. It provides an empirical 
analysis of the reform of the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS – better known as 
“UNAIDS” – which brings ten UN agencies and a Secretariat together. It focuses on the 
efforts that have been made to improve the governance of UNAIDS, as well as the various 
side-effects that may prevent to achieve its objectives.  
 
This paper pays particular attention to “management reforms,” defined as the various 
intentional actions taken by governing bodies, on one or several occasions, to change the 
formal rules, procedures and mechanisms of the organizations over which they have 
authority. These reforms aim at influencing decision-making and regulation processes 
regarding power distribution, resource allocation (such as financing and budgeting), human 
resources (such as staff distribution, recruitment, and career paths), and policy-making 
(planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation)1. 
 
After having briefly presented the UNAIDS Programme, this paper pays attention to 
UN system-wide reform as an institutional context that created a momentum for reforming 
the management of UN agencies in the response to AIDS. Then, it explores the conditions 
under which the reform of UNAIDS has been implemented since the early 2000s. Finally, it 
                                                
1 Therefore, this paper does not concentrate on “institutional reforms,” which not only relate to decision-making 
and regulation within organizations, but also involve intentional change in the whole structure of an 
organizational system. Institutional reforms aim at setting new “constitutive rules” or at least profoundly 
changing the existing ones. They usually look for an extensive, multi-layered reorganization of a bureaucratic 
structure (units, departments, sectors, agencies, etc.). Both management and institutional reforms are intended to 
change governance mechanisms, so the distinction is a merely theoretical. Empirically, some management 
reforms may be so extensive as to result in institutional reform. 
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examines some of the side effects of the reform, with particular emphasis on competition 
between UN agencies, organizational complexity, and bureaucratization. 
 
1.0 THE UNAIDS PROGRAMME: AN INNOVATIVE SYSTEM FOR IMPROVING 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL PARTNERSHIP WITHIN THE UN BUREAUCRACY  
 
UNAIDS is an innovative institutional mechanism aiming at strengthening the 
commitment of UN organizations to respond to HIV and AIDS, one of the most critical 
challenges for development. It brings together the efforts and resources of ten UN 
organizations involved in the response to the epidemic2: the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 
the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), the International Labour Organization (ILO); the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health 
Organization (WHO), and the World Bank. These organizations have the status of 
“Cosponsoring organizations,” better known as “Cosponsors.”  
 
UNAIDS was created in 1994 by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It 
began its activities in 1996. From the outset, it was viewed as a groundbreaking system, as it 
had been given the task of improving UN governance by transcending organizational barriers 
between Cosponsors, strengthening interagency collaboration and contributing to a more 
efficient and integrated multilateral system. From this perspective, the creation of UNAIDS 
was seen as an important institutional experiment, highlighting the aspiration to establish new 
governance mechanisms in the UN system at global level.  
 
Within UNAIDS the Cosponsors operate under the authority of a governing board. 
They are assisted by a Secretariat, whose role and activities have incrementally broadened 
over the years. The UNAIDS Secretariat’s task is twofold: it is mandated to raise funds 
targeting the HIV/AIDS epidemic and to distribute them among the Cosponsors; it also 
assists the Cosponsors in various ways, including through the promotion of coordinated and 
scaled up efforts to respond the epidemic. Moreover, it is expected to provide strategic 
information about the epidemic, mobilize technical resources, and engage with governments 
and civil society. It is to a large extent a “secretariat of UN secretariats”. 
 
In 1994, the ECOSOC assigned UNAIDS a very ambitious role in the long run, as the 
Joint UN Programme was officially established to build global consensus on policy responses 
to AIDS. Through UNAIDS, governments from the North and South, the UN system, and 
international partners from civil society were asked to agree on a global framework to combat 
a scourge that was jeopardizing years of effort in development, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, in contrast to other UN programmes whose main objective is to coordinate 
the efforts of State actors, the creation of UNAIDS was first and foremost a response to 
internal UN organizational challenges. The ECOSOC decision to create UNAIDS took place 
in the context of the early nineties, when harsh criticism was focused on the capacity of the 
UN system to provide an efficient response to the epidemic under WHO leadership. Through 
UNAIDS, the Cosponsors were given the mandate of developing a multi-sectoral and 
                                                
2 At the outset, UNAIDS brought together six organizations. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, four new UN 
entities joined the “UNAIDS family”. 
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integrated response to HIV and AIDS, by harmonizing their goals and objectives, 
constructing common tools and instruments, sharing knowledge and technical expertise, 
speaking “with one voice,” and, finally, jointly delivering at country level. Interagency 
cooperation was expected to bring about a swift, reactive, and large-scale commitment by the 
UN to affected countries3.  
 
From a broader perspective, as an interorganizational mechanism UNAIDS is 
expected to ensure the convergence – and, wherever possible, a close match – of policy goals 
in the areas of prevention, impact mitigation, and access to treatment. It is also mandated to 
facilitate the elaboration of common management standards and work agreements in the 
various policy sectors associated with the response to HIV and AIDS. A system such as 
UNAIDS challenges the Cosponsors to connect and better integrate their activities, even 
though they are complex organizational systems driven by different mandates, particular 
policy agendas, specific knowledge and norms, distinct technical expertise, and, last but not 
least, internal management procedures and bureaucratic routines. It also aims to reduce 
competition in fund-raising and fragmentation in decision-making, as well as overlap and 
duplication of effort in the provision of technical assistance to governments and key 
stakeholders in developing countries. 
 
At first sight, the functioning of the UNAIDS Programme provides a noteworthy 
example of the restructuring efforts that have been tried out to better coordinate the many 
UN bodies and activities dedicated to development and poverty alleviation. To a great extent, 
when it was started in 1996 UNAIDS was a forerunner of the UN system-wide reform policy 
launched by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the 2000s. Within the UN system, UNAIDS 
was the first Programme dedicated to building a multi-sectoral response combining the efforts 
of various agencies. Not only was it a sui generis partnership system within the UN 
architecture, it was viewed as an innovative system intended not to do “business as usual” in 
the UN.  
 
UNAIDS is thus a good example of the institutional reforms the UN system has 
sought to set in motion in recent years. Both the progress made in interagency coordination 
and partnership in the last decade, and the large number of obstacles that still continue to 
impede progress toward a unified UN response to HIV and AIDS, offer significant 
illustrations of the challenges that go with reform activity in the UN system.  
 
2.0 UN SYSTEM-WIDE REFORM AND UNAIDS 
 
In recent years, the many UN specialized agencies, funds, and programmes have been 
challenged by governments of OECD countries to improve their internal management 
(Knight, 2000; Bauer and Knill, 2007). In the beginning of the new millennium, this call was 
the result of two factors: the US government’s wish to reduce the influence of the UN system 
by reducing its budget, and the shared perception by other Northern countries that the UN 
reform might help them retain relevance in an international landscape in which UN 
organizations are “smaller players” in the aid mechanisms. Such pressure emanating from 
                                                
3 Until the mid-2000s, one of the major obstacles to efficient programmes remained the absence of 
interconnection between prevention, care, support, and treatment policies, both at the programmatic and 
operational levels. At country level, this situation has led to national AIDS strategies focusing primarily on 
public health issues, generally driven by the Ministries of Health, without a clear understanding of the multi-
dimensional aspects – social, educational, cultural, political, economic, and judicial – which should be 
incorporated into a comprehensive approach. 
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OECD countries to reform the management of IOs has been taking place in a context of 
global diffusion of new public management (NPM) rules and instruments, attesting to the 
globalization of the neoliberal paradigm already in place in the 1990s (Suleiman and 
Waterbury, 1990; Common, 1998). 
 
During the 2000s broad consultations were undertaken, leading to a series of high-
level meetings on the mechanisms of development assistance4. These meetings were clearly 
intended to introduce NPM into multilateral organizations. They resulted in the adoption of 
resolutions enjoining IOs to pool resources, undertake joint programming, build knowledge 
networks, coordinate the provision of technical support, simplify legal procedures, evaluate 
their results on a regular basis, and align their programmes with government development 
plans.  
 
The pressures for organizational restructuring became very high during Kofi Annan’s 
tenure as UN Secretary-General. In 1997 and again in 2002, the Secretariat General launched 
a vast series of management reforms aimed at making the UN system more transparent and 
accountable. The UN General Assembly assigned the executive heads of agencies, funds, and 
programmes considerable obligations to reform their management rules and standard 
procedures. In recent years, several reports have addressed UN organizational challenges5. 
Four executive committees (Peace and Security; Economic and Social; Development; 
Humanitarian Affairs) have offered the chance to better coordinate the activities of thirty 
UN programmes. The UN Development Group (UNDG), together with the Chief Executives 
Board (CEB), has helped define general guidance to bring the programmes and management 
systems of the various UN organizations closer together. An independent High-Level Panel 
on UN System-Wide Coherence has been assigned to address organizational problems and 
provide a set of reform proposals to the UN Secretary-General6.  
 
The call for UN system-wide reform created a momentum that immediately affected 
UN activities on HIV and AIDS. In 2003-2004, just after the release of an independent 
evaluation of UNAIDS (December 2002), member states representing donor countries started 
to criticize the weaknesses of the UNAIDS Programme and the lack of accountability of the 
Cosponsors. As in many other fields of development, it was noted that the functioning of the 
UN system was unsatisfactory: Cosponsors did not deliver responsive technical assistance in 
the field; programmes were fragmented and not coordinated; implementation was inefficient; 
and there were rivalries and jealousies among agencies. Moreover, it was observed that many 
Cosponsors were acting in parallel with independent agendas, and therefore burdened the 
national administrations of developing countries.  
 
The flaws, obstacles, and other impediments to an integrated and efficient UNAIDS 
Programme were remarkably visible, as UNAIDS was supposed to be a groundbreaking 
system tasked with dedicating resources to overcoming traditional organizational challenges 
and increasing coherence through interagency coordination. In 2005, as the donors’ warnings 
were not leading to noticeable and swift improvements, at the instigation of the British 
government some OECD governments took the initiative of setting up a Global Task Team 
                                                
4 The Monterrey Conference (2002), the Rome Forum on Harmonization (2003), the Marrakech Round Table on 
Results-Based Management (2004), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the 2005 UN World 
Summit, and, more recently, the Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2008). 
5 See, for instance, the reports One United Nations (United Nations, 2005a), In Larger Freedom (United 
Nations, 2005b), and Delivering as One (United Nations, 2006a). 
6 See the report Investing in the UN (United Nations, 2006b).  
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(known as the “GTT”) on improving AIDS coordination among multilateral institutions and 
international donors. Following the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD-DAC, 
2005), the GTT made recommendations for the governance of the multilateral response to 
AIDS (Global Task Team, 2005). It urged the Cosponsors and the Secretariat to better 
coordinate in order to improve the coherence of the Joint Programme. It called for a reform of 
their management rules with tangible results that could be assessed and measured. The UN 
General Assembly subsequently endorsed its recommendations during the 2005 World 
Summit. In this context, Cosponsors and the Secretariat have embarked on management 
reform.  
 
3.0 MANAGEMENT REFORMS IN THE UNAIDS SYSTEM 
 
This section identifies the major steps through which UNAIDS organizations have 
recently engaged in efforts to set up new performance-based management instruments on the 
one hand, and to strengthen interorganizational coordination procedures in order to reduce 
policy gaps, fragmentation, duplication of efforts, and competition within the UN system on 
the other hand. It pays particular attention to the activities of the UNAIDS Secretariat, which 
has been empowered to recommend new organizational arrangements within the Programme. 
In this context, the Secretariat7 has demonstrated an ability to function as a “reform broker.”  
 
3.1 The Dissemination Of NPM Instruments 
 
At the start of the Joint UN Programme, following the ECOSOC recommendations, the 
UNAIDS governing board established a set of joint coordination rules that made exchanges 
among Cosponsors possible at the highest level. A steering committee8 was established to 
give an opportunity for the Cosponsors’ executive directors to meet twice a year, with a 
requirement to report to the governing board on efforts undertaken by each UN agency 
contributing to the UNAIDS Programme.  
 
Throughout the early years, coordination and partnership rules were thus set up and 
institutionalized. At a technical level, the increasing number of workshops led to the setting 
up of new discussion forums in policy areas that seemed critical for improving the response 
to the epidemic. For instance, UNAIDS Interagency Task Teams (IATTs) were established to 
encourage UN experts on AIDS to hold regular discussions on cross-cutting issues of 
particular interest to several Cosponsors (such as education, children, youth, gender, and 
injecting drug use).  
 
Up to the early 2000s, the technical partnerships within UNAIDS were still dependent 
on voluntary initiatives by the Cosponsors. They relied on many informal rules established in 
a limited number of policy areas. The Secretariat had neither the influence nor the mandate to 
compel Cosponsors to hold a policy dialogue on cross-cutting issues. In addition, no 
institutionalized mechanisms existed to facilitate information-sharing between Cosponsors on 
joint initiatives that could move the UNAIDS Programme forward, nor the pledging of 
financial resources by Cosponsors in support of the Programme, nor on policy results at 
country level.  
 
                                                
7 When this paper refers to “the Secretariat” as a reform entrepreneur, it refers to the top and senior managers of 
this administration (executive head, team leaders, and high-profile technical staff).  
8 The Committee of Cosponsoring Organizations (CCO). 
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The mid-2000s marked a shift in the partnership’s conditions. Between 1999 and 
2003, the growth of the UNAIDS Programme from six to ten actors9 opened a window of 
opportunity: it resulted in a greater need for new regulations for internal governance, as the 
potential risk of dispute within a larger interagency system was higher. New initiatives on 
AIDS could not be sustainable without formal rules producing more transparency and 
accountability within the Programme. In short, the integration of new members into 
UNAIDS, along with pressure from donors, was a critical opportunity for the Secretariat to 
act as a broker of reform.  
 
A first shift took place in 2005 during a closed-door session of a meeting that brought 
together the Cosponsors’ heads of AIDS programmes. The objective was to share out the 
2006-2007 UNAIDS funding resources10 among the ten Cosponsors. Up until then, the 
distribution had been based on previous years’ decisions, not on a performance review. At 
this meeting, participants adopted informal criteria to assess the quality and scope of each 
Cosponsor’s programme, and then voted (by secret ballot) for a sharing out of the funds. For 
the first time, UNAIDS funds were allocated according to the mutual assessment of 
Cosponsors’ strategies and results. The allocation was explicitly linked to policy results.  
 
A few weeks later, the Secretariat was empowered by the Global Task Team to 
introduce new NPM-inspired principles and instruments aimed at improving the management 
of the UNAIDS Programme. It has been highly involved in setting standards regarding 
finance and policy development. It has contributed to the dissemination of new regulations 
covering budget management and accounting procedures, using a results-based management 
(RBM) approach. It has held several consultation meetings with Cosponsors to come up with 
measurable policy objectives. It has supported the establishment of performance indicators 
and benchmarks to help monitor and assess the UNAIDS Programme. It has also contributed 
to the adoption of budget control procedures, aimed at reinforcing the transparency of budget 
appropriations, setting tracking procedures to assess the use of funds (e.g., through the 
adoption of implementation rates), and constructing the relevant indicators needed to measure 
the impact of Cosponsors’ AIDS programmes. In 2007, such a multi-agency results-based 
budget was unique within the UN system.  
 
Since 2006-2007, the Cosponsors have agreed to shift towards result-assessment 
procedures. They have been invited to design their own programmes using these procedures, 
to tie all their sub-units that use UNAIDS funds (including field offices) to the selection of 
quantified indicators, and to be held accountable for the results. The objective of this in-depth 
transformation is to avoid the situation that prevailed during the first decade of UNAIDS: an 
absence of formal rules for the allocation of UNAIDS funds to Cosponsors, complemented by 
a lack of tracking of the use of the funds, of results-based indicators, and of independent 
oversight procedures, and a general trend among the Cosponsors to spend financial resources 
on scattered and non-coordinated small projects.  
 
3.2 Harmonization, Rationalization, Coordination 
 
In 2005, the Secretariat seized the opportunity of the Global Task Team 
recommendations to push the UNAIDS governance reform of in three directions: policy 
harmonization, clarification of agencies’ jurisdictions, and interagency coordination. These 
                                                
9 Four new UN organizations: ILO, UNODC, WFP, and UNHCR. 
10 The UNAIDS budget (the so-called “UBW”) has three components: one is allotted to the Cosponsors, a 
second to the Secretariat, and a third to “interagency activities.” 
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three dimensions aim to improve the effectiveness of the UN response to the epidemic by 
preventing agencies from developing independent, duplicate, and competing strategies. 
 
Streamlining strategies 
 
Efforts for harmonization within the multilateral system were undertaken at the global 
level. One of the significant modifications of UNAIDS was the elaboration of a limited 
number of joint strategic objectives11. In parallel, at the request of the UN General Assembly 
the Secretariat organized consultation meetings at country and regional levels to build a joint 
policy framework that could be endorsed by all UNAIDS partners and also conceived as 
worldwide guidance for internationally recognized policy standards and key objectives. The 
Assembly endorsed this framework in 2006, leading to the setting of national targets and a 
revision of national AIDS strategies in most of 123 countries12.  
The effect of this programmatic shift on Cosponsors’ programme has been uneven. On the 
one hand, Cosponsors have paid particular attention to these expected results when it came to 
providing the UNAIDS governing board and key donors with progress key data and 
information in progress reports. They have had to align their performance indicators to the 
key results. Greater effort and resources have been dedicated to conducting various 
assessments, reviews, and evaluation of UNAIDS efforts in selected areas of activities, 
resulting in the publication of public reports. On the other hand, Cosponsors continue to base 
their global strategies on their own priorities, and their programmes on AIDS scarcely reflect 
UNAIDS as a family and do not focus on the expected “key results.”  
 
Division of labor 
 
Policy harmonization may appear irrelevant without a clear identification of the UN 
agencies’ respective jurisdictions with regard to the epidemic. Thus, in 2005, the Global Task 
Team enjoined the Cosponsors to make substantial efforts to clarify their mandates, a 
prerequisite for improving interagency collaboration. The UNAIDS family was, in a sense, 
invited to put an end to major flaws in the UN system: competition among agencies, 
programmatic fragmentation, policy overlaps and gaps, and lack of accountability.  
Under the pressure of the Global Task Team, the Secretariat took the initiative to elaborate a 
“UNAIDS Division of Labor” with the aim of specifying which policy areas each Cosponsor 
was responsible for. From now on, each Cosponsor is responsible for one (or several) specific 
policy area(s), depending on its mandate and its “comparative advantage” in the field. For 
instance, UNICEF is responsible for the support of orphans and vulnerable children, 
UNESCO for HIV prevention education in educational institutions, UNFPA for prevention 
activities among key populations, and UNHCR for all activity related to refugees and 
internally displaced people.  
 
Coordinating activities 
 
Collaborative action is decisive for policy-making, as a steady flow of strategic 
information and dissemination of knowledge among UN bodies is essential for integrating 
                                                
11 The 2006-2007 UNAIDS budget was the first budget to be built on a results-based structure, identifying 16 
“Principal Results” for UNAIDS as a whole and 49 “Key Results” for the more specific activities performed by 
Cosponsors and the Secretariat. 
12 Called “Towards Universal Access,” this framework seeks to connect the various sectoral responses that 
might lead to greater access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care, and support. It clearly put the emphasis 
on country-led responses to AIDS, which are to be multi-sectoral and participatory.  
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their sectoral approaches and therefore developing coherent policy guidance. Above all, 
coordination is crucial in the provision of technical assistance in the field of HIV and AIDS. 
UN organizations ensure transfer of expertise, knowledge, and skills to support governments 
and national stakeholders in implementing AIDS responses (planning, budgeting, monitoring, 
and evaluating) in various fields (e.g. public health, education, finance, agriculture). They 
also contribute to capacity development in countries where the public sector has weak 
capacities to respond to the epidemic. They participate in the development of results-focused, 
evidence-informed, and cost-effective strategies, as well as in the review of existing action 
plans. 
With the active support of the Secretariat, three new vertical mechanisms were created to 
channel UN assistance to a variety of beneficiaries (such as the National AIDS Councils, 
national ministries, CSOs, the private sector, and sometimes bilateral organizations and other 
UN agencies). For instance, UNAIDS established new support desks in nearly 60 countries. 
These Technical Support Facilities (TSF) were tasked with helping identify and contact the 
relevant experts and consultants who can assist national authorities or stakeholders in the 
design of programmes and in problem-solving in various areas: management, 
communication, strategic planning, resource mobilization, monitoring and evaluation. In 
2006, UNAIDS also established a permanent forum (called GIST13) bringing together a 
limited number of UN agencies, funding organizations, bilateral donors, and NGOs to build 
rapid and coordinated technical responses to requests from governments. The same year, 
another service (called ASAP14) was created to offer advice and channel technical support for 
strategic and action planning. It acts as a liaison office between country actors and 
Cosponsors, the UNAIDS Secretariat, and consultants around the world. 
 
4.0 WHY ARE BUREAUCRATIC REFORMS FALLING SHORT? 
Nobody can challenge the fact that UNAIDS pledged an increasing amount of 
resources to improve the governance of the UNAIDS Programme. Cosponsors engaged in an 
in-depth reform of their in-house micromanagement and policy-making mechanisms, which 
could have created new internal and interagency tensions. Nevertheless, as often 
demonstrated in the scientific literature on public organizations, actual bureaucratic change 
hardly reflects the intentions of the reformers (Nay, 2009b; Eymeri-Douzans, 2010). Any 
reform has hidden costs and side-effects that should always be questioned. Part 4 elaborates 
on some unexpected effects of managerial reform, with particular emphasis on competition 
between UN agencies, organizational complexity, and bureaucratization. 
 
4.1 Competition 
 
In the early 2000s, various Cosponsors brought up international initiatives without 
much prior consultation of their partners. Some Cosponsors also used the vague argument of 
“comparative advantage”15 to strengthen their activities in policy areas covered by the 
mandate of other UN organizations. This situation not only raised tensions within the 
UNAIDS family, it also increased the risk of having a disunited UNAIDS system with 
competitive and disorganized programmes. 
 
                                                
13 The Global Implementation Support Team. 
14 This service, the AIDS Strategy and Action Plan service, is hosted by the World Bank. 
15 “Comparative advantage” is a notion often used by some organizations as a rhetorical device to defend their 
legitimacy to develop country-focused activities outside their official mandate. In making this argument they 
usually claim that their country presence is the most effective because of their resources, expertise, successful 
(past and ongoing) projects, and/or connections to government or other national stakeholders. 
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In 2005, the official UNAIDS Division of Labor was adopted with the aim of 
reducing competition among UN partners. But today, when it comes to translating and 
implementing this formal and binding framework at the country level, competition still 
undermines the capacity to act jointly. The Cosponsors still compete to mobilize resources 
from bilateral organizations, mainly because of a lack of donor coordination. They also work 
to expand the scope of their activities while at the same time they have to align with national 
priorities. The UN country offices with the greatest capacity16 and those with ongoing 
programmes on HIV and AIDS are not keen to give up their activities because of some 
formal principles adopted at the global level. Their top management finds ways to adapt the 
Division of Labor to “the local reality” and to defend the projects they have been 
implementing up to now. Thus in many countries dissension has arisen between Cosponsors’ 
representatives when it comes to implementing the Division of Labor, taking into account the 
“comparative advantage” of each Cosponsor in the field of HIV and AIDS. At the national 
level, UN Joint Teams on AIDS have to agree on how to adapt the distribution of tasks 
among UN agencies for the provision of technical support, especially between agencies who 
have weak capacities at country level, but are considered a “Lead Organization” according to 
the formal Division of Labor, and those with stronger capacities who are officially reduced to 
the status of “Main Partner.” 
 
For instance, despite the Division of Labor, the programmes and activities carried out 
by the World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO, and UNFPA in the field of education and 
HIV/AIDS do not always appear to be specialized and differentiated on the ground. All these 
four UNAIDS Cosponsors have been supporting national or local educational projects 
targeting vulnerable populations, particularly women and young people. UNESCO and the 
World Bank are also developing competing training programmes for professionals and 
government officials. UNDP, the World Bank, and the Secretariat are still building 
overlapping country-level strategies aimed at providing technical support to reform national 
governance mechanisms in the field of HIV and AIDS17. UNFPA and UNDP elaborate 
overlapping projects in the field of gender equality and AIDS-related discrimination towards 
women and girls. DfID noted another example of competition in an evaluation report (Drew 
and Attawell, 2007, A79): “In Zimbabwe, there are concerns about UN capacity, ability to 
engage in policy dialogue, diversion from core roles, and poor coordination. Some steps have 
been taken to developing one UN team and programme on AIDS, but this is currently an 
aggregation of individual agency plans. Practical obstacles to developing a truly unified team 
and programme include competition between UN agencies, separate locations and 
organizational systems, overlap of responsibilities in some areas e.g., prevention of mother to 
child transmission and young people …”  
 
4.2 Organizational Complexity  
 
The reforms launched after 2005 in UNAIDS had clear objectives: simplifying 
mechanisms, streamlining strategies, combining activities. They also expected clear outputs: 
a reduction of transaction costs and an increase in the efficiency of bureaucratic activity. 
However, reforms may sometimes increase organizational complexity for one key reason: 
reformers frequently introduce new bodies, policy instruments, and procedures, without 
having the capacity or legitimacy – or sometimes the courage – to remove the old ones.  
                                                
16 For various reasons (historical, political, structural), some UN country offices may have more resources 
(funds, expertise, human resources, privileged access to national officials, linkages to CSOs and the media, etc.) 
than others. 
17 This situation was mentioned by member states at the 23rd UNAIDS executive board meeting (Dec. 2008). 
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Coordination mechanisms are supposed to reduce compartmentalization and competition in 
interorganizational systems; to some extent, they help develop a comprehensive and 
integrated policy approach. But at the same time they may also lead to bureaucratization by 
multiplying the horizontal and vertical channels through which managers and policy actors 
are expected to interact. While such mechanisms seek to reduce the waste of resources, they 
may add new transaction costs for all the partners who have to adapt to multiple channels or 
entities without abandoning their regular organization’s standard procedures. 
 
A good example within UNAIDS is the creation of the three new interagency UN 
mechanisms to channel the provision of technical assistance (mentioned in part 3.2), which 
have generated new opacity while trying to simplify UN procedures. Firstly, the division of 
Labor between these bodies remains unclear to the many country-level recipients and 
stakeholders who are expected to ask for technical support. Secondly, these mechanisms also 
interfere with the recognition of Cosponsors, in the 2005 Division of Labor, as “Lead 
Organizations” and “Main Partners,” each being responsible for the provision of technical 
support in the specific policy areas covered by their mandate. Thirdly, these mechanisms also 
have to connect with the UN Theme Groups on HIV/AIDS (country-level committees 
bringing together UN technical staff, which operate under the authority of the UN Joint 
Teams on HIV/AIDS). Fourthly, they have to find added value in each country where 
40 other technical support providers may intervene, ranging from bilateral and multilateral 
agencies to private foundations and civil society organizations. If the ASAP is presented as a 
“one-stop shop,” what is the TSF supposed to do in alignment with ASAP? How does the 
ASAP Secretariat (based at the World Bank) fully harmonize and streamline its activities 
with the 60 offices implementing the TSF (located in UNAIDS offices)? Both mechanisms 
propose overlapping technical support, such as peer reviews, strategic and operational 
planning, costing and budgeting, financial management, monitoring and evaluation tools for 
HIV/AIDS programmes, and resource mobilization.  
 
The GIST also developed some grass-roots operational activities aimed at providing 
technical assistance to host governments and other stakeholders. Its original mandate was to 
establish country-level implementation support teams (CISTs). The GIST did not have an 
easy start, as it was confronted with interagency tensions, with some agencies not inclined to 
participate for various reasons: lack of clarity and a shift in its mandate; uncertainty about 
governance and accountability; lack of capacity; costly meetings; slow responses; low profile 
among stakeholders; and insufficient information flow and linkages between GIST and the 
regional and country offices of UN agencies (Moodie, 2008). It was then found to duplicate 
efforts at country level and, subsequently, its mandate was thoroughly reformulated, shifting 
it from an operational entity to a global policy forum.  
 
4.3 Bureaucratization  
 
Bureaucratization can be defined as a process by which an organizational system 
takes on the characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy. It is a process of institutional change, 
which relates to a number of transformations: the relationships within the organizational 
system are increasingly driven by a complex of formal, rigid norms; staff members are 
specialized in narrowly-defined tasks; professional positions and roles are shaped according 
to impersonal rules; decision-making follows rational procedures rather than the personal 
feelings of individuals; command and power relations are distributed according to a division 
of Labor based on hierarchy. As Weber pointed out, bureaucratization goes along with a 
process of rationalization of activity, as an organizational system becomes broader, more 
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complex, and permanent. Central to this process is the formalization, standardization, and 
depersonalization of rules, as is the increase in the number of bureaus and levels of decision.  
 
From this perspective, bureaucratization goes along with greater complexity of 
mechanisms and procedures, proliferation of decision-making bodies, and higher risk of 
internal compartmentalization and competition. For this reason, it is most often regarded as a 
negative process, even a “pathology” of public organizations, as administrative growth may 
be driven by internal forces rather than external policy demands from populations, 
constituencies, and/or political representatives’ choice (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, 34-41). 
 
Within the UN system, recent reforms have aimed at reducing the negative effects of 
bureaucratization. Better management is likely to develop cost-effective public activity by 
improving accountability and reducing transaction costs. Better coordination is likely to 
improve the effectiveness of public policy by stimulating information flows, encouraging 
joint policy planning, and developing integrated implementation activity. But an in-depth 
reform process also requires additional human resources, technical capacities, funding 
sources, new coordinating bodies, and co-management instruments. For these reasons, it may 
end by adding new layers of bureaucracy.  
 
Within UNAIDS, these arguments can be borne out both by Cosponsors’ internal 
activity on AIDS and by the Secretariat’s expansion. During the 2000s, Cosponsors were 
seriously encouraged to strengthen their commitment to responding the epidemic. Global 
mobilization against HIV and AIDS produced an increase in funding for IOs and therefore 
led to a scaling up of UN capacity. But at the same time both the context of UN reform and 
the donors’ criticism of the multilateral response to AIDS drove the Cosponsors to turn much 
of their attention and resources to governance challenges, tackling especially the issues of 
efficiency (“make the money work”) and UN coordination (“delivering as one”). Since 2005, 
this focus on governance has even been perceived by UN managers as a survival strategy in a 
competitive and polyarchic global AIDS governance in which many state and non-state actors 
are challenging the UN system. In response to repeated requests from the UNAIDS governing 
board, Cosponsors have been concentrating on tracking funds, drafting reports, gathering 
statistics, developing monitoring and evaluation procedures, with the desire to demonstrate 
their capacity to deliver and their aptitude to work jointly. This has led Cosponsors to recruit 
officers assigned to management and coordination tasks rather than policy experts. It has 
pushed them to secure more funds to ensure that in-house management and interagency 
coordination comply with donor requests. It has led to a growing number of coordinators and 
gate-keepers at every stage – called “global coordinators,” “regional advisors,” or “focal 
points” – whose main task is to support coordination mechanisms, moderate tensions 
(between agencies and/or within departments and units in each agency), and report on 
activities at all levels. Not only might this change be distracting attention from policy 
substance and field activities, it could also be increasing organizational costs.  
 
The analysis of the UNAIDS Secretariat provides a critical example on how a size-
limited coordination body can become a bureaucratic entity in a few years. As already 
mentioned, the Secretariat has first and foremost a facilitating role, with the task of 
supporting the Cosponsors in the establishment of a Joint UN Programme. Like any 
international secretariat, it had no mandate to exert leadership or participate in policy 
development. Nevertheless the Secretariat’s activities gradually expanded during the first ten 
years of the Programme, with a substantial scaling up in recent years. The Secretariat has 
gained influence in two directions: it has played a increasing role in the dissemination of 
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innovative policy ideas and evidence-based knowledge about HIV/AIDS18 (cognitive 
influence); and as mentioned above, in the context of UN reform it has been given an 
opportunity to play a larger role in the establishment of management and coordination rules 
(prescriptive influence).  
 
This development of the Secretariat as a “policy entrepreneur” (Mintrom, 1997) has 
contributed to strengthening its bureaucratic capacities. The number of staff based in Geneva, 
initially 100, nearly doubled over the first decade. In addition to the liaison office based in 
New York City, two new offices were created in Washington and in Brussels to liaise with 
the US Congress and the EU Commission. More recently, seven UNAIDS “Regional Support 
Teams” were established to provide assistance to UNAIDS Country Offices, while working 
with regional partners to participate in programming and technical support for national 
stakeholders. Finally, the Secretariat brought the number of its “UNAIDS Country 
Coordinators” from originally 50 up to more than 80 in 2007. In parallel, while the UNAIDS 
country offices were originally represented by one staff person, they have expanded in recent 
years, recruiting managers, officers, and experts, including 60 “Partnership Officers” and 
“Focal Points.” The teams working as Technical Support Facilities (TSF) have also been 
located in these offices. Until the mid-2000s, most UCCs had a medium profile: they were 
“programme officers” (level P4-P5 in the UN ranking). In recent years, their status has 
changed in a number of countries, as some of them became heads of larger offices and were 
involved as full members of UN Country Teams19. More UNAIDS Country Coordinators 
have since been recruited at a director level (level D1) and named “UNAIDS Country 
Directors,” in order to allow them to function as equals with other country directors. In 
general, the Secretariat seized the Global Task Team’s recommendations and the UN 
Secretary-General’s decisions as windows of opportunities to strengthen its field 
representation. It could thus participate in the promotion of country-led UN reform in the 
field of HIV and AIDS, although it had initially no specific mandate at this level.  
 
The increasing activity of the Secretariat goes along with the progressive 
bureaucratization of UNAIDS: increase in number of staff, recruitment of experts and 
consultants, appointment of country-level UNAIDS representatives, development of field-
based offices, and increasing participation in official partnership and decision-making bodies 
inside and outside the UN at global, regional, and country levels. The UNAIDS Secretariat is 
more and more present in the host countries where Cosponsors are implementing 
programmes. Its staff often stand for the whole “UNAIDS family” but at the same time also 
more and more often represent the UNAIDS Secretariat as a UN entity. Thus the Secretariat 
does not appear only as a “platform” or a “policy facilitator” through which UN agencies 
interact. It is slowly shifting to a more structured organization with increasing roles and wider 
responsibilities. We might even consider that by engaging in policy development the 
Secretariat tends to become the “11th Cosponsor” of UNAIDS. 
                                                
18 The literature on policy transfer provides a valuable analytical framework for the analysis of international 
bureaucracies’ activities, especially when one concentrates on information and knowledge. Thus international 
secretariats are involved in many activities that ensure the transfer of ideas from one organizational setting to 
another one. See: Nay, 2009. 
19 In each country, the UNCT is composed of the heads of the UN agencies. Chaired by the UN Resident 
Coordinators (RC), they play a critical role in planning and coordinating the country activities of UN agencies. 
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This empirical study of UNAIDS offers insights into understanding the processes and 
possible unintended consequences of managerial reforms undertaken within IOs. I suggest 
two concluding remarks. 
 
Firstly, in the 2000s the growing attention of donors to the issue of global governance 
has had an impact on the work of multilateral organizations, especially UN partners: 
bureaucratic change becomes an end in itself, as UN organizations have turned their primary 
attention to management and coordination challenges. This may be seen as a step forward in 
the field of HIV and AIDS, since it has surely helped UN agencies to move away from years 
of mismanagement, competition, and fragmentation of agency plans associated with a vast 
and muddled multilateral system. Nevertheless, the focus on governance issues may well 
result in a reallocation of resources (human, financial, technical) towards improving the UN 
architecture rather than focusing on the assistance needed by governments and key 
populations at the implementation level. It could thus encourage UN professionals working 
on HIV/AIDS to concentrate primarily on institutional processes instead of paying greater 
attention to policy development. Gathering statistics that meet requirements set by new 
indicators and benchmarks, or setting new coordinating mechanisms at all levels, may have 
partly satisfied donors and other financial partners. But it took a lot of energy, time, and 
money, which may have diverted the attention of UN experts from the urgent challenges they 
ought to be taking up, or at least weakened their responsiveness to the epidemic. 
 
Secondly, the reformers have not proved to be able to anticipate and control the 
various effects of the new situation they have initiated. Of course, one should acknowledge 
that reformers, thanks to their experience and lessons learned, have contributed to some 
improvements – such as strengthening financial accountability and transparency thanks to 
new budgeting procedures, and contributing to the elaboration of a global multi-sectoral 
policy framework. But there are unexpected effects that may hamper the scope of the 
reforms, due to behavioral resistance from bureaucrats, contextualized interpretations of the 
rules, specific power relations among UN organizations at country level, and institutional 
routines that generate path-dependent processes. The reform objectives may generate tensions 
with some organizational interests (e.g., pooling financial resources at country level may 
worry organizations who usually raise significant extra-budgetary funds); objectives may be 
confronted with the weight of institutionalized norms and routines (e.g., creating horizontal 
coordination mechanisms may lessen vertical control procedures); they may not be adapted to 
social, organizational, and historical situations at country level (e.g., some efficient country 
level coordination mechanisms may differ from the Division of Labor elaborated at global 
level).  
 
Administrative reforms, however well-intentioned, generally create as their immediate 
result confusion, anxiety, and the diversion of resources to management and organizational 
procedures. The real benefits should be measured over a longer time period. They should be 
gauged at a policy level, not a bureaucratic level, through an assessment of policy outcomes. 
This challenge is a primary one for both researchers and evaluators, as major resources need 
to be engaged to study the correlation between administrative reforms and the multilateral 
response to the AIDS epidemic. Unfortunately this still remains a “blind spot.”  
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